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Abstract:  After the exclusive rights in copy-
right have been consolidated in a century-long his-
torical development, limitations and exceptions have 
become the main instrument to determine the ex-
act scope of copyright. Limitations and exceptions 
do not merely fine-tune copyright protection. Rather, 
they balance the interests of authors, rightholders, 
competitors and end-users in a quadrupolar copy-
right system. Understanding this is of particular im-
portance in the digital and networked information 
society, where copyrighted information is not only 
created and consumed, but constantly extracted, re-
grouped, repackaged, recombined, abstracted and in-
terpreted.
However, serious doubts exist whether the present, 
historically grown system of limitations adequately 
balances the interests involved in the information 
society. Both the closed list of limitations allowed 
under Art. 5 of the EU Information Society Directive 
2001/29/EC and a narrowly interpreted three-step 
test contained in Arts. 13 TRIPS and 5 (5) of the In-
formation Society Directive appear as obstacles in 
the way of achieving the appropriate balance needed. 
This brief article outlines the issues involved which 
were discussed at the International Conference on 
“Commons, Users, Service Providers – Internet (Self-)
Regulation and Copyright” which took place in Han-
nover, Germany, on 17/18 March 2010 on the occa-
sion of the launch of JIPITEC.
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1	 For more than a century, the process of the forma-
tion and later the harmonization of copyright mainly 
focused on the definition and subsequent enlarge-
ment of the scope of exclusive rights. This is equally 
true for the national, the European, and the inter-
national level. In a first step, the core of the exclu-
sive rights was established, comprising the rights of 
reproduction, translation, adaptation and commu-
nication to the public.1 In a second step, additional 
rights were defined, such as the resale royalty right, 
the distribution right, the rental and lending right 
and, most recently, the making available right.2 Of 
course, at the international level, not all of these 
rights are equally binding,3 and technically speaking 
the minimum rights contained in international con-
ventions are only applicable to non-nationals. How-
ever, a third step then saw the enlargement of exist-
ing exclusive rights, or, in other words, a tendency 
to formulate exclusive rights ever more broadly. To 
cite just the most prominent example of the repro-
duction right: from “reproduction in any manner 
or form” (Art. 9 (1) BC) via “the permanent or tem-
porary reproduction of a computer program by any 
means and in any form, in part or in whole” (Art. 4 
(a) of Directive 91/250/ECC) for computer programs 
and the “temporary or permanent reproduction by 
any means and in any form, in whole or in part” (Art. 
5 (a) of Directive 96/9/EC) for original data bases to 
“direct or indirect, temporary or permanent repro-
duction by any means and in any form, in whole or 
Limitations: The Centerpiece of Copyright in Distress
2010 51 1
in part” (Art. 2 of Directive 2001/29/EC) for copy-
righted works in general. Most likely, the develop-
ment will not even stop there, as can be witnessed, 
for example, in Germany where a draft amendment 
to the Copyright Act proposed by newspaper pub-
lishers proposes to treat even the mere “represen-
tation” of protected subject matter on a computer 
screen as a reproduction.4
2	 The traditional view of copyright as a set of exclusive 
rights is guided by the aim to provide for as much 
protection as possible. Nowhere has this been formu-
lated more clearly as in the recitals of the Infosoc Di-
rective. According to recital 4, only “providing for a 
high level of protection of intellectual property, will 
foster substantial investment in creativity and inno-
vation.” Similarly, recital 9 of the said Directive ex-
presses the fundamental belief that “[a]ny harmoni-
sation of copyright and related rights must take as a 
basis a high level of protection, since such rights are 
crucial to intellectual creation.” It is this “owner”- 
and “property”-centered approach which provides 
the momentum for an ever-increasing level of pro-
tection, and which has even more far-reaching con-
sequences because of a simultaneous lowering of the 
threshold of protection5 and of a continuous prolon-
gation of the term of protection.6 Of course, this fo-
cus on authors and rightholders and, together with 
it, on the increase in the level of protection can eas-
ily be explained by historical reasons and by current 
economic and technical developments. Historically, 
copyright – or authors’ rights, to be more precise 
– are understood as a legal instrument to protect 
the interests of authors. In copyright countries, the 
overall approach may be more utilitarian in nature 
and thus internalize aspects other than the protec-
tion of interests of authors to a higher degree than 
in authors’ rights countries. However, in both copy-
right and author’s rights countries the increase in 
exclusivity is largely driven by rightholders’ pow-
erful lobby groups. In economic terms, these groups 
have been able to convince the national legislature 
to provide for strong international protection for ex-
ported copyrighted works in foreign markets with 
hitherto weak legal protection and lack of enforce-
ment of laws.7 Moreover, in technical terms, the in-
crease in the exclusivity of copyright protection may 
be explained as a reaction against the ease of un-
authorized copying and distributing of copyrighted 
works brought about by digitization and network-
ing technologies.
3	 From this perspective, which is mainly taken by 
rightholders, limitations and exceptions to the ex-
clusive rights are seen almost as the unavoidable 
evil, i.e., the necessary concession to be made to 
public interests which does little more than cutting 
away some of the exclusivity granted by the exclu-
sive rights and which, therefore, should be kept at 
a minimum.8 In addition, from this perspective the 
exclusive rights appear as the rule, whereas limita-
tions apparently are nothing more than mere excep-
tions. This has led the courts in some member states 
– notably Germany – to follow the principle that in 
case of doubt, limitations should be narrowly inter-
preted.9 There is another imbalance between exclu-
sive rights on the one hand and limitations and ex-
ceptions on the other. Whereas exclusive rights are 
subjective rights that grant their respective owner a 
legal power against third parties and which in many 
countries are consequently protected by the consti-
tutional guarantee of property, limitations and ex-
ceptions are – at best – legal privileges devoid of any 
higher-ranking legal protection.10 
4	 However, limitations and exceptions are more than 
just the unavoidable tribute to “the public.” Rather, 
limitations fulfill not only one, but several tasks. 
First of all, from a technical point of view, where 
the exclusive rights are broadly defined, the limita-
tions and exceptions are the decisive legal element 
that defines the exact contours of the exclusivity. 
Second, limitations and exceptions thus help to fine-
tune the balance between the proprietary interests 
of authors and rightholders on the one hand, and of 
conflicting interests on the other hand. This explains 
why limitations and exceptions are nowadays such a 
battlefield, contrary to the exclusive rights as such. 
Moreover, it should be noted that in balancing the 
interests at stake, limitations do not only provide 
a black-and-white, all-or-nothing answer. Rather, 
limitations can differentiate between a total excep-
tion from the exclusive right (i.e., no permission is 
needed and no payment has to be made) and claims 
for remunerations (i.e., no permission is needed, but 
remuneration has to be paid).11 The claim for remu-
neration can be an individual one or one which can 
only be made by collecting societies, as is often the 
case in some of the EU member states. Third, what is 
usually referred to as “the public” is comprised of a 
whole set of interests which merit legal protection. 
Contrary to a widely held belief, copyright limita-
tions and exceptions do not only benefit end-users. 
Rather they help to define the delicate relationship 
between authors, rightholders, and end-users and – 
which is often overlooked – they also define compe-
tition in the area of downstream information value-
added production chains.12 Finally, it should be noted 
that not all limitations are based on the same ratio-
nale. Although classifications vary, one might distin-
guish limitations and exceptions covering use acts of 
little or no independent economic value, from lim-
itations and exceptions for the purpose of freedom 
of expression and information and limitations and 
exceptions which promote social, cultural, and re-
lated political objectives such as, but not limited to, 
exceptions for the purpose of research and educa-
tion. Other limitations and exceptions have been ad-
opted in order to enhance competition or just cor-
rect market failure.13 
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5	 In other words, after the exclusive rights in copy-
right have been consolidated in a century-long his-
torical development, limitations and exceptions 
have become the main instrument in order to de-
termine the exact scope of copyright. Even more, 
limitations and exceptions do not merely fine-tune 
copyright protection; rather, they balance the in-
terests of authors, rightholders, competitors, and 
end-users in a quadrupolar copyright system. This 
is all the more true in the digital and networked in-
formation society, where copyrighted information 
is not only created and consumed, but constantly 
extracted, regrouped, repackaged, recombined, ab-
stracted, and interpreted. 
6	 However, serious doubts exist whether the present, 
historically grown system of limitations meets these 
requirements. These doubts are nourished by a num-
ber of reasons: 
7	 Although the InfoSoc Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 
May 2001 purportedly harmonizes certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information soci-
ety, it only prescribes one mandatory exception and 
leaves the 20 others at the discretion of the member 
states. This may not be seen as problematic if one 
works on the assumption that what counts most is 
the harmonization of exclusive rights. However, as 
demonstrated above, at least for practical reasons, 
what counts in modern copyright law are no longer 
the exclusive rights but rather the limitations and 
exceptions. Consequently, one may conclude that 
the InfoSoc Directive hardly brought any harmo-
nization whatsoever,14 in particular since member 
states cherry-picked whatever limitations and ex-
ceptions they liked to have in their respective na-
tional legislation.
8	 Another problem – at least at the European level – is 
that the InfoSoc Dircetive provides for a closed list of 
limitations and exceptions that does not leave room 
for even a small and flexible fair-use-type exception. 
However, there is an urgent need for such a flexible 
–albeit de minimis – exception in view of the rapid 
technological development of the information so-
ciety infrastructure and the different  new business 
models and use possibilities. Since these new busi-
ness models and use possibilities can hardly be fore-
seen, it is rather unlikely that what should be exempt 
from the exclusive rights will be adequately covered 
by existing limitations and exceptions that were de-
fined in the InfoSoc Directive almost a decade ago in 
view of the then existing technology. At any rate, the 
lack of a sufficiently flexible limitation or exception 
will either result in a more or less far-fetched inter-
pretation of existing limitations and exceptions, or 
in overbroad exclusive rights. Neither of these two 
scenarios is an appealing one.15    
9	 At the international level, the three-step test is of-
ten understood merely as a test for prohibiting lim-
itations and exceptions. This is all the more true if 
the three steps are applied as subsequent “filters” 
and if the second step – “normal exploitation” – is 
construed as covering any exploitation possibility 
that might arise during the whole of the copyright 
term of the subject matter concerned. Needless to 
say, such an interpretation, which is often propa-
gated by major corporate rightholders, tends to up-
set the balance of conflicting interests to be struck 
by the limitations and exceptions. The situation is 
even more aggravated by the fact that – contrary to 
its counterparts in patent and trademark law16 – Art. 
13 TRIPS does not mention interests of “third par-
ties” to be taken into account. In view of all this, a 
more appropriate approach seems to be called for, 
according to which the three-step test works as an 
instrument which both may prohibit and enable lim-
itations and exceptions.
10	 Last, but certainly not least, it seems worth noting 
that the structure of existing limitations and excep-
tions has been developed in view of relatively short 
production and delivery chains (rightholder – pro-
ducer/communicator – end-user) that no longer 
correspond to the much longer production, trans-
formation, delivery, and consumption chains of the 
digital networked environment. It can be assumed 
that these changes in reality should be reflected in 
the formulation of limitations and exceptions in a 
much better way than is presently the case.
11	 Of course, there have been several attempts to rem-
edy the unsatisfactory situation just described in or-
der to avoid “protecting ourselves to death.” Only 
two of these attempts shall be briefly mentioned 
here. The first is the “Declaration on a Balanced In-
terpretation of the ‘Three-Step Test’ in Copyright 
Law” of the Munich Max Planck Institute and the 
Queen Mary University of London.17 This Declaration 
makes the case that “the Three-Step Test should be 
interpreted so as to ensure a proper and balanced ap-
plication of limitations and exceptions.” To this ef-
fect, the Declaration expresses the opinion that “[w]
hen correctly applied, the Three-Step Test requires a 
comprehensive overall assessment, rather than the 
step-by-step application that its usual, but mislead-
ing, description implies” and that “[n]o single step is 
to be prioritized.” Moreover, “[t]he Three-Step Test 
should be interpreted in a manner that respects the 
legitimate interests of third parties, including in-
terests deriving from human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms; interests in competition, notably on 
secondary markets; and other public interests, no-
tably in scientific progress and cultural, social, or 
economic development.” The second of these ini-
tiatives are the model provisions an limitations and 
exceptions formulated by the European academics 
who collaborated in formulating the Draft European 
Copyright Code.18 The drafters – the so-called “Wit-
tem-Group” – were guided by the belief “that rapid 
technological development makes future modes 
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of exploitation and use of copyright works unpre-
dictable and therefore requires a system of rights 
and limitations with some flexibility.” In order to 
achieve this, the Code – although heavily borrow-
ing from Art. 5 of the InfoSoc Directive – is not lim-
ited to a restatement of the existing acquis commu-
nautaire. Rather, by defining certain limitations as 
non-exclusive normative examples, and adding the 
possibility of limitations and exceptions similar to 
“[a]ny other use that is comparable to the uses enu-
merated,” the Draft Code “reflects a combination of 
a common-law-style open-ended system of limita-
tions and a civil-law-style exhaustive enumeration.” 
Moreover, in addition to the limitations and excep-
tions regarding use acts of little or no independent 
economic value, use acts made for the purpose of 
freedom of expression and information, use acts in 
line with certain social, cultural, and related political 
objectives, and use acts for the purpose of research 
and education, the Draft Code contains a special ex-
ception which privileges certain uses for the purpose 
of enhancing competition, thus integrating a control 
mechanism similar to the one hitherto reserved to 
competition law into copyright itself.  
12	 Against this backdrop of copyright and its discon-
tents – as one may call it – the first session of the 
International Conference on “Commons, Users, Ser-
vice Providers – Internet (Self-)Regulation and Copy-
right” which took place in Hannover, Germany, on 
17/18 March 2010 explored both the status quo and 
the legal possibilities for shaping the limitations 
and exceptions in a way that they contribute to a 
balanced and well-limited copyright system that 
satisfies the needs of the information society and 
meets with acceptance by all four interest groups 
concerned. Several contributions – which are partly 
reproduced following this brief introduction and 
partly in the next issue of JIPITEC – first examined 
what the EU member states made out of the list of 
non-mandatory exceptions and limitations in Art. 
5 of Directive 2001/29/EC (Guibault). Subsequently, 
the relationship between copyright and the freedom 
of expression was highlighted, in particular in view 
of Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Geiger). Likewise, the possibilities and limits 
for a fair use approach under the famous three-step 
test were explored (Senftleben), in particular in view 
of the Max Planck Declaration regarding the three-
step test and its further impact (Hilty). Finally, some 
conclusions regarding limitations, the centerpiece of 
copyright, were drawn (Griffiths).
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